Liège was protected by a belt of modernised forts, the relics and heirs of the fortified position that had delayed the Germans in 1914. In May 1940, after the fall of Ében-Émael and the breach of the Albert Canal, the question arose of how to use this position and the field troops supporting it.
The dilemma was the classic one of fortified places. Keeping the field army around Liège to defend the position risked seeing it encircled. Withdrawing it towards the KW Line preserved the mobile troops, but left the forts isolated, thrown back on their own resources.
The Belgian command could withdraw the field troops towards the KW Line, leaving the forts to hold out alone as long as possible. It could defend the position of Liège with the field army, at the risk of encirclement. Or it could evacuate the entire region, forts included, to concentrate its effort to the west. The stakes were to avoid the encirclement of the field army while still making use of the fortifications.
The Belgian command withdrew the field troops towards the KW Line so as not to expose them to encirclement, leaving the forts of Liège to hold out alone. Several works (Aubin-Neufchâteau, Battice, Tancrémont…) would hold for several days, and in some cases several weeks, pinning down German forces but unable to change the course of the campaign. The decision, which repeated that of 1914 (the 3rd Division had then left Liège, leaving the forts to resist alone), avoided the encirclement of the field army, but condemned the fort garrisons to a solitary and ultimately hopeless fight. It illustrates the fate of fixed fortifications in the face of a war of movement: useful for delaying, incapable of stopping.
T03-109