11 days after entering the war, must set the terms of the armistice Italy will impose on France. The general offensive launched that same day along the Alpine front is turning into a fiasco: Olry's army holds its positions, and the Italian troops barely advance despite crushing numerical superiority, in the snow and cold of the high valleys.
The Duce had dreamed of a great prize: Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunisia, Djibouti. But 2 constraints rein him in. His son-in-law Ciano pleads for moderation, so as not to drive the French fleet and Empire into British arms. Above all, Hitler has let him know that he must not demand too much: the Reich wants to spare the future Vichy government in order to make it a docile partner. Hitler, who has just presented France with his own armistice terms, intends to retain mastery of the settlement and not let his ally compromise his calculations.
Mussolini must arbitrate between the maximalist display that would satisfy his propaganda and a more measured line — between his ambitions for spoils, the failure of the Alpine offensive, and Berlin's position.
Mussolini settles for symbolic gains — the occupation of Menton and a demilitarised zone —, aligning with Hitler. The Franco-Italian armistice, signed on 24 June at the Villa Incisa near Rome, grants Italy only a thin occupied zone around Menton and a 50 km demilitarised strip along the border. No annexation in metropolitan France, no Tunisia, no Corsica, no Djibouti. For the Duce, it is a masked humiliation: militarily repulsed in the Alps, he obtains almost nothing from a victory to which he has so little contributed. This imbalance between proclaimed ambitions and meagre real gains foreshadows Italian difficulties in the years to come, in Greece and then in Africa.
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