On 21 June 1940, with the Franco-German armistice about to be signed, Mussolini demands an Italian offensive in the Alps: he needs a victory to show before the fighting ends. General commands the 1st Army, committed on the southern sector of the Alpine front down to the coast toward Menton.
Facing him, General Olry's , far less numerous, holds a chain of mountain fortifications (the 'Alpine line' of the Maginot) on terrain that massively favours the defender. Conditions are atrocious: snow, fog, high altitudes, passes locked by concrete works.
Pintor knows that the attack, ordered for reasons of prestige, runs up against nearly insurmountable obstacles. His divisions, poorly equipped for high mountain warfare, lack boots, warm clothing and artillery capable of reducing the forts. Pintor can launch the massive offensive as Mussolini demands, settle for a symbolic demonstration for appearances' sake, or refuse an order he judges militarily absurd.
Pintor executes the Duce's order and launches the offensive on all axes. The result is a tactical failure: impossible to cross snow-covered passes held by intact fortifications. Italian losses run into the thousands (killed, wounded, frostbitten) for a few kilometres gained around Menton, while French losses remain very low. The Franco-Italian armistice of 24 June ratifies this failure: Italy occupies only a thin border strip. The Battle of the Alps, the only one where the French army of 1940 keeps the advantage, will remain eclipsed by the general debacle. Pintor then chairs the Italian armistice commission with France; he dies in a plane crash on 7 December 1940.
T04-035