At 3:15 a.m. on 22 June 1941, the German artillery opens fire along the whole front and the Luftwaffe destroys hundreds of Soviet aircraft on the ground.
The invasion catches the in total disorder: despite countless warnings — from spies like Sorge, from defectors, from the British — Stalin has refused to believe in an imminent attack and has forbidden any mobilisation that might have "provoked" Germany.
Hundreds of Soviet frontier units are caught off guard that night. Communications are cut, orders contradictory or absent; some staffs, paralysed by the terror of the purges, dare decide nothing without Moscow. The first directives from above, unrealistic, order impossible counterattacks.
You command a sector of the frontier, under fire and without clear instructions. You have to choose: hold your position at all costs as doctrine demands, at the risk of encirclement; pull your unit back to preserve it, in defiance of orders that forbid it and at the risk of being shot as a "defeatist"; or counter-attack blindly according to the unrealistic instructions of the moment.
Most frontier commanders cling to their positions, for want of autonomy: Soviet doctrine and Stalinist terror proscribed withdrawal. Conduct varies all the same, with units caught by surprise breaking up or falling back without orders; and above the sector commanders, the first directives ("Directive No. 3") throw the mechanized corps into absurd counter-offensives. The result is catastrophic: in a few weeks, the Wehrmacht achieves giant encirclements (Białystok-Minsk, Smolensk, soon Kiev) and captures millions of Soviet soldiers, many of whom will die in captivity. But some pockets resist beyond all reason (the fortress of Brest holds for weeks), and the immensity of the territory, the depth of the reserves, and the very brutality of the occupier end by working against the invader. The initial disaster of 1941, the fruit of Stalin's blindness, nearly lost the USSR; it did not lose it.
T08-004