Convoy SC-42 numbers 65 merchant ships out of Sydney, Nova Scotia, in late August 1941. It is a slow group — 7 knots — laden with steel, fuel, and raw materials bound for Liverpool. The escort comes down to 4 Canadian ships: the destroyer HMCS Skeena, from which Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Hibbard commands as Senior Officer Escort, and the corvettes HMCS Alberni, Kenogami and Orillia. Reinforcements have been requested but cannot arrive for at least 24 hours.
In the night of 9-10 September, the first explosions tear the darkness to starboard. Torpedoes. Radio signals crackle: 1, then 2, then 4 ships hit. A wolf pack has found the convoy off Greenland. Hibbard calculates: 4 escorts covering a perimeter of several nautical miles, a black night, perhaps 8 U-boats lying in wait.
He can break off with his escorts to hunt the submarines aggressively by sonar, temporarily leaving the convoy unscreened; maintain close escort around the merchant ships and hold out until reinforcements arrive; or request authority to scatter the convoy so that individual ships present harder targets.
Hibbard holds his screen and sends urgent calls for help. The Canadian corvettes Chambly and Moose Jaw join on 10 September and sink U-501; on the 11th come 3 more corvettes, a trawler and the British 2nd Escort Group, with more on the 12th. The battle lasts 3 nights. 16 ships are sunk and 276 men killed: the worst Allied convoy loss since SC-7, a year earlier. The toll underlines the glaring insufficiency of 4 escorts for 65 merchant ships. Scattering, as PQ-17 demonstrates the following summer, proves even deadlier. The SC-42 episode accelerates Allied demands for permanent escort groups and very-long-range air cover. The failure belongs to the system, not the commander.
T09-074