A month after the start of Barbarossa, the German , spearhead of the offensive toward Moscow, reaches Smolensk, the lock on the great road to the capital. The armoured groups of Hoth and Guderian achieve a new giant encirclement, trapping several Soviet armies in a vast pocket around the city, taken on 16 July.
On the Soviet side, Marshal Timoshenko is charged with plugging the breach with motley, ill-equipped forces, thrown into the battle as they arrive. Doctrine and Stalin forbid any surrender of ground; but to sacrifice entire armies in an untenable pocket is militarily absurd.
Timoshenko must decide: order the encircled armies to hold in place to pin the enemy, at the risk of their annihilation; attempt to make them break out eastward to save forces, in defiance of the no-withdrawal orders; or launch relief counter-attacks from outside the pocket. On this choice depends the survival of hundreds of thousands of men — and the pace of the German advance toward Moscow.
Timoshenko relies on relief counter-attacks launched from outside the pocket: in late July, fresh armies drawn from the reserve and formed into operational groups strike the German flanks. Poorly coordinated and very costly, they nonetheless help General Konstantin Rokossovsky's group keep open a narrow corridor, through which part of the encircled 16th and 20th Armies escapes in early August; only some 50,000 men get out. The Smolensk pocket is reduced on 5 August, yielding about 300,000 prisoners. But the battle, prolonged until September by further Soviet counter-offensives (including the one at Yelnya), has an unexpected effect: it wears down , exhausts its armour and makes it lose precious time. It is partly for this reason that Hitler will soon divert the main effort toward Kiev and Leningrad, postponing the assault on Moscow. The fierce resistance at Smolensk, paid for at a terrible price, helps to throw off the German timetable — the first grain of sand in the 'lightning war' in the East.
T08-018